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I. INTRODUCTION
There are bad deficits and there are good deficits. What makes a
fiscal deficit good or bad depends on both the context in which the
deficit is run and the reason that the deficit is rising.I The belief that it
is unquestionably foolish to adopt policies that directly or indirectly
increase the government's annual borrowing on the financial markets
- which is what it means to run a budget deficit 2 - is not the
universal truth that the current conventional wisdom might imply.
Budget deficits are potentially dangerous and must be monitored
carefully, but they are not always, inevitably, completely, and
irreversibly horrific. Far from it. For example, just as families can
sensibly take out mortgages to buy homes and float student loans to
finance higher education, so too can governments borrow money to
finance investments that will produce greater returns to society than
their costs.
Knowing that deficits are not evil incarnate raises some difficult
questions, however, most notably whether it is dangerous for policy
makers or economists to admit publicly that deficits might sometimes
be the result of wise policy choices. While there is always a danger
that such knowledge can be distorted and misused, I argue in this
article that we have a responsibility to adjust our public discussion of
budget deficits to admit that there are good deficits as well as bad.
Enhancing the discourse requires us to remind ourselves what it is
about budget deficits that can make them harmful, both in the long
term and the short term, as a necessary step in understanding when
deficits can be beneficial. Only then can we have a full and honest
discussion of our taxing and spending policies.
A. Our Political Fixation on the Government's Budget Deficit
To say that American politicians and policymakers are interested
in - one might even say frequently preoccupied with - budget
deficits is to state the painfully obvious. For decades, political debate
I See infra Parts II.A and C for descriptions of the conditions under which it is
arguably wise to run a fiscal deficit.
2 See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term
Deficits, 58 TAX L. REV. 275, 289 (2005) [hereinafter Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits].
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has prominently included concerns about the level of the federalS• 3
government's annual budget deficit. Prior to Bill Clinton's
presidency, there was a partisan divide on the issue, with Democrats
mostly showing less concern for deficits and Republicans focusing on
the issue as evidence of their opponents' fiscal irresponsibility.4 Since
the early 1990s, however, both parties have aligned in their stated
beliefs that the budget deficit is a serious problem that must be
solved.5 Each party, naturally enough, attempts to blame the other for
what are thought to be high deficits; 6 and though it is sometimes
politically expedient for the party in power to downplay either the size
of deficits or their importance, it is safe to say that both major political
parties in the United States are now united around the idea that
deficits are a scourge that must be stopped.7
This unity of opinion in the political arena has been largely
replicated in the world of policy analysis and public opinion.
Nonpartisan think-tanks and advocacy groups (such as the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, Citizens for Tax Justice, 9 and many
others) include fiscal policy as a major part of their focus and
regularly express the opinion that budget deficits are a burden on the
future.'0 The "National Debt Clock" in Times Square, which has been
3 Linda Feldmann, Summit on Budget Deficit Called for by Greenspan,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 2, 1983, at 2 (discussing Alan Greenspan's warning
that the federal budget deficit posed a long-term threat to the economy).
4 David Hoffman, Reagan Takes His Tax Bill on Sales Trip to the West, WASH.
POST, Aug. 12, 1982, at Al (describing Reagan's claim of "[forty] years of [Democrat]
fiscal irresponsibility").
5 Kenneth N. Gilpin, Clinton's Economic Plan Finding Respect from Corporate
America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at Al (describing Clinton's leadership in handling
the "problem" of federal budget deficits).
6 Carolyn Lochhead, Laying Blame for the Budget Deficit, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., July 24, 1992, at Al (discussing President George H. W. Bush's plan to
blame Democrats for budget deficit in order to deflect blame from himself).
7 Scott Cox, One of the Hottest Elections, On the Campaign Trail..., DAILY
BUDGET BYTES, Oct. 16, 2006, available at www.gallerywatch.com (follow "Services"
hyperlink) ("Doubtless, some Members [of Congress] will want to raise the issue of
large budget deficits as a way of tarring their opponents or of stressing the need for
fiscal responsibility."); Jim VandeHei, Democrats Will Try a Hybrid of Old, New
Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2004, at A01 (describing Democrats' plan to reduce the
federal budget deficit faster than it would be reduced under President George W.
Bush's plan).
8 See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.cbpp.org (last visited
Dec. 14,2006).
9 See Citizens for Tax Justice, http://www.ctj.org (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).
10 JAMES HORNEY & RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITES,
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running since 1989,1 purports to show the up-to-the-minute aggregate
national debt and the share of that debt borne by individual families.
2
Some have used these figures to calculate the portion borne by each
citizen. 3 Indeed, at least one major policy organization, the Concord
Coalition,14 was founded specifically in response to concerns about the
deficits experienced in the 1980s. Notably, the Concord Coalition was
founded by two former senators, the conservative Republican Warren
Rudman and the late liberal Democrat Paul Tsongas, in part as an
effort to demonstrate that deficit reduction should be a nonpartisan
effort. 5
Unsurprisingly, the press in general and the business press in
particular have also largely reported the deficit story as being
uncontroversial in terms of good and bad. Deficits are bad and deficit
reduction is good." Certainly, the press will print stories on the
politically charged nature of the budget debate at any given time; but
journalists seem to accept as simple fact that deficits are always bad
and must be reduced.
17
In opinion columns, the rhetoric can become colorful even from
nonpartisan journalists. One of the business reporters for The New
York Times began an "Economic View" column as follows: "Never
mind the movie. This was the real Mission Impossible. Could three
dozen ordinary American adults .. . reach agreement on how to
prevent a fiscal train wreck?" '18 The column described a focus group
DON'T POP THE CORKS - CBO OUTLOOK FOR THE FEDERAL BUDGET IS STILL BLEAK
(Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/8-17-06bud.htm; see also CITIZENS FOR TAX
JUSTICE, 99% OF AMERICANS ARE NET LOSERS UNDER BUSH TAX AND SPENDING
POLICIES (June 29, 2006), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/debtus.pdf ("[F]or all but the very
wealthiest United States residents, the Bush tax cuts between 2001 and 2006 are
outweighed by a dramatic increase in the burden of debt on American families.").
' See Niall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 11, 2006, at 46.
12 Id.
13 See Ed Hall, U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debtclock/
(showing Outstanding Public Debt of $8,533,492,821,033.24 and concluding that "each
citizen's share of this debt is $28,491.78") (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).
14 See The Concord Coalition, About Us, http://www.concordcoalition.org/about.
html (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).
15 Id.
16 Are Bush and Congress Truly Ready to Slash Deficits?, KIPLINGER LETTER,
Mar. 4, 2005 (stating that big entitlements have to be reined in to make a serious dent
in deficits).
17 See, e.g., id.
IS Edmund L. Andrews, Public's Deficit Fix May Stun Politicians, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2006, § 3, at 4.
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put together by the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation,
and the Concord Coalition that brought together a diverse group of
citizens to "explor[e] public attitudes on the gap between taxes paid
and promises made."1 9 Reportedly, "[v]irtually no one needed to be
persuaded that the federal budget is on an unsustainable path.... The
federal deficit is likely to be 'only' about $300 billion this year, but
deficits over the next [ten] years could total more than $2 trillion if
policies remain unchanged. 20 Indeed, the point of the column was
apparently to express amazement that regular folks are much more
sensible about making the "tough choices" on deficit reduction than
are their elected representatives: "So if there was a message, it was
not that people wanted to dodge tough choices. It was that they
wanted good ideas from their leaders."21
The political preoccupation with budget deficits also affects policy
discussions even when budget effects are far from the central focus of
analysis. For example, a recent law review article examining the use
of affirmative action in an auction process used by the Federal
Communications Commission was titled: Deficit Reduction Through
Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction
Competition. The article, which is quite insightful in describing some
counter-intuitive results of a bidding process that included credits for
businesses owned by minorities and women, is certainly not focused
on "the deficit." Indeed, the authors conclude that the use of
affirmative action in a 1993 auction increased total revenues from the
auction by "nearly $45 million., 23  To put this number into
24perspective, the federal budget deficit in 1993 was $255.1 billion,
making the $45 million in revenues from the auction less than 0.02%
of the budget deficit.
The authors, in fact, do not claim that $45 million is a significant
contribution to deficit reduction, but they instead argue that
politicians might look more kindly on a program that does not cost
money: "The revenue-enhancing effect, however, shows that




22 Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How
Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REv. 761
(1996).
23 Id. at 763.




thought. Demonstrating that such measures need not drain the
treasury might be imperative for garnering legislative support....
[T]he revenue effect... may establish a necessary condition for
politically justifying [affirmative action].' '  This might well be true.
Even so, it is noteworthy that, rather than simply saying that a
seeming subsidy ends up being a net revenue raiser for the
government - a fact that would be interesting no matter what the rest
of the budget looked like - the authors chose to describe this
program as one that results in "deficit reduction," not only in the text
26of the article but as the first two words of its title. The authors
obviously knew what their target audience was likely to find exciting,
even if deficit reduction was decidedly beside the point.
Again, that budget deficits are a focus of concern is not news.
However, any time that there is such a broadly-held consensus about a
public policy issue - particularly a public policy issue that is very
technical and that few citizens, journalists, or politicians are actually
likely to understand - at least two possibilities arise: first, everyone is
right; or second, everyone believes the same thing because it is
intuitively appealing (and maybe also simply because everyone else
seems to believe it). This article explores the premise of the latter
possibility - that is, I take seriously the idea that the conventional
wisdom that deficits are always bad is an incomplete or inaccurate
description of the state of economic knowledge. It is not my purpose
here to explain how mass opinion is formed or to discern why virtually
everyone seems to believe a half-truth. Instead, I directly confront the
propositions that the fiscal deficit is a bad thing and that actions must
be taken immediately to prevent the fiscal disaster that so many
people apparently believe is surely coming.
B. Opposing Deficits versus Opposing Bad Fiscal Policies
As an initial matter, it is important to set aside one category of
arguments, specifically whether failing to be "against the deficit"
automatically means that one approves of a particular policy that
happens to raise the deficit. In fact, a person could well believe that
deficits (at least at their current levels and at the levels that are
actually likely to exist in the future) are not the problem that they are
made out to be, yet still believe that some changes in our current fiscal
policy mix are necessary. For example, repealing all or part of the




various tax cuts enacted during the current President Bush's terms in
office would certainly reduce the deficit; but reducing the deficit is
hardly the only reason to favor repeal of those tax cuts. Concerns
about income distribution, perverse incentives, and bad tax
administration, for example, can all motivate calls for repeal of those
specific tax bills as well as proposals for other changes in tax and
spending policy.
Any change in tax or spending policy affects the level and future
path of deficits, of course, but intent matters. If it turns out that the
deficit is not always the problem that it is so often made out to be, that
removes one argument from the arsenal of those who propose tax
changes that reduce the deficit; and it removes one hurdle from those
who disagree. That does not by any means end the debate. If, as I
believe, the Bush tax cuts were a terrible mistake for reasons beyond
their effects on deficits, then they should be repealed. Having the
additional argument that the deficit is a bad thing, of course,
strengthens the case. As it happens, the analysis in this article implies
that while deficit spending is in some circumstances beneficial to the
economy, the Bush tax cuts do not fall into that category and are thus
damaging both because they are "bad deficits" and for other reasons
as well, most prominently that they are profoundly unjust. It is thus
consistent to argue that deficits are not always bad but that these tax
cuts - in addition to their other defects - lead to the bad kind of
deficits.
C. The Approach in this Article
In an earlier article, 7 I addressed the issues raised by long-term
deficits from a more orthodox perspective.2 In that article, I reviewed
some of the basic issues in the measurement of fiscal deficits,
2 9
described how the long-term prospects of the Social Security system
interacted with the rest of the government's fiscal prospects, 30 and
finally assessed a relatively new method of computing long-term fiscal
deficits (or the "Fiscal Gap") known as "Generational Accounting"
that attempts to forecast the net present value of all deficits into the
31infinite future. I concluded that Generational Accounting was a
fatally flawed approach to trying to predict the long-term fiscal path of
27 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 2.
28 Id. at 286-98.
29 Id. at 285-98.
0 Id. at 298-306.





Rather than simply arguing that the Generational Accounting
approach to forecasting long-term fiscal deficits was fundamentally
flawed, though, my argument looked at the alternatives to that
approach to see if there was something better that could guide• 33
policymakers. My conclusion was that more traditional deficit
measures such as ten-year deficit forecasts, though still highly
imperfect, were at least adequate to guide policymakers who were
concerned about the possible harms that deficits might visit on the
economy and - even more importantly - were not subject to the
shortcomings that make Generational Accounting far too easy to
manipulate.34 In short, it was not just that Generational Accounting
was flawed but that those flaws were sufficiently serious that it was
comparatively worse to use Generational Accounting than to rely on
ten-year deficit forecasts.
35
This article extends the analysis from my earlier article in two
ways. First, in my earlier article I basically accepted for the purposes
of argument that deficits are per se harmful. While it would hardly be
surprising if my skepticism about the underlying idea that deficits are
generally a bad thing came through to readers, the analysis was
focused on how best to measure deficits to guide policy and not on
whether policy should be aimed at deficit reduction in the first place.36
I analyzed the harms of deficit spending through the traditional lens of
"crowding out," which (as I describe in Part II below) is the idea that
deficits reduce future economic growth by reducing the amount of
37private investment in a given year.
In this article, by contrast, I describe why deficits might not
always be harmful after all, or more accurately, why they are harmful
in certain circumstances but not in others. Perhaps surprisingly, it is
not difficult to find economists who have argued against the idea that
38all budget deficits should be eliminated. While virtually everyone
32 Id. at 325-26 (concluding that Generational Accounting is "based on highly
contestable assumptions, makes questionable analytical choices, and is inherently
incapable of providing the useful baseline that its proponents promise").
33 Id. at 285-86.
34 Id. at 325-26.
35Id. at 285 (describing the choice between ten-year budget deficits and
Generational Accounting as "[t]he [i]mperfect vs. [t]he [f]undamentally [f]lawed").
36 Id. at 325-26.
37 Id. at 296.
38 Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really - I Mean, Really - A Burden, in
DEBT AND THE TWIN DEFICITS DEBATE 209 (James M. Rock ed., 1991) (describing
[Vol. 26:325
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would agree that it is possible to run deficits that are so large that they
harm the economy, the question is whether our current and plausible
future policies require a commitment to significant and immediate
deficit reduction. I conclude that deficits can be harmful but that the
harms need to be balanced against the benefits; and I suggest that our
obsession with deficit reduction causes us to run the distinct risk of
reducing deficits in ways that are far worse than not reducing them.
Second, even if we believe that there are situations in which
deficits are acceptable (or are even a very good idea), I raise the
possibility that we should nonetheless engage in a "noble deception,"
that is, that we should agree not to talk about the possible benefits of
deficits in order to prevent the public and policy makers from jumping
to the unwarranted conclusion that if deficits are not always bad, then
there is no reason to worry about deficits. This is a very real concern,
given the sound-bite-driven nature of current political discourse.
Ultimately, however, I conclude that deceptions - perhaps especially
noble deceptions - are unwise and can ultimately cause more harm
than good. It should be possible to discipline policy debate to allow us
to be honest about the choices we face without being doomed to make
foolish choices based on half-truths.
The fiscal choices that we make today affect our lives today, our
lives in the future, and the lives of generations yet unborn.
Understanding what is - and what is not - harmful and helpful
about budget deficits is essential for policymakers and the public at
large. The budget deficit matters, but it matters in ways that are too
often poorly understood. The result of such misunderstanding can
cause us to enact well-meaning policies that move us in the wrong
direction. Greater understanding of all of the issues raised by budget
deficits is thus essential to good governance and prudent fiscal
stewardship.
If. ARE DEFICITS ALWAYS HARMFUL? Is DEFICIT REDUCTION
ALWAYS GOOD?
Because of the generally low level of economic knowledge in the
population at large and (perhaps especially) among politicians, it is at
himself as a "middle-of-the-road, middle-class, middle-aged economist," id. at 209,
and describing a former congressman's apparent surprise when three out of four
economists testifying at a congressional hearing - one of whom was Professor
Blinder - stated that they "would vote for $15 billion in additional spending on




least possible that the near-universal aversion to deficits is based on
little more than gut reactions to the idea that borrowing is bad
("neither a borrower nor a lender be"39) or that governments should
be forced to "live within their means" just like any family must do.40 If
those or similar concerns motivate anti-deficit feelings, though, then
the argument is not that deficits are harmful to the economy but that
deficits are simply immoral or irresponsible no matter whether they
have any effect on living standards. The argument ends there,
because it is not really an argument but a matter of moral certitude.
Another source of popular concern about the deficit might arise
from some "very old-fashioned arguments that were based mostly on
myths and misunderstandings [and that] are still an important part of
the popular folk wisdom.",4' The economist Alan Blinder, a former
vice-chair of the Federal Reserve and a prominent fiscal policy
analyst, puts these arguments quickly to rest. One argument is that
"[i]f we borrow too much, the nation will go bankrupt," an argument
that may be true for some smaller economies but "not for the United
States. Because our deficits are financed by issuing debt that is
denominated in dollars, "we can always print as many dollars as we
need. 43 While this may be "wise or foolish,"" any "fear of default is
simply a red herring in the U.S. case.,
45
Furthermore, any concern that deficits must necessarily be
inflationary, even if such a concern might once have been plausible,
"sounds silly now." 46 As Blinder points out, the experience of the
1980s demonstrated that one could have a simultaneous increase in
the annual budget deficit and a decline (and near-disappearance) of
inflation.47  The U.S. experience in the decade-and-a-half since
Blinder wrote his article further demonstrates the lack of any
connection between the level of the deficit (which rose and fell
39 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.
40 Robert W. Hahn, The Cost-Benefit of Budget Cutting, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
2006, at B17 ("Our government should not only live within its means .... ). Of
course, this argument ignores the increasing frequency with which many families live
beyond their means. Fiscal rectitude is surely easier to preach than to practice.






47 Id. at 218-19.
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dramatically over that period 48) and inflation (which mostly stayed at
the low levels reached in the 1980S49).
Thus, two of the more widely cited reasons to believe that budget
deficits are harmful are based on one tautologically incorrect
argument and on another empirically discredited one. Of course,
many economists and well-educated policy analysts know full well that
these arguments are simply wrong, but they have much more
substantial concerns that cause them to advocate deficit reduction.
That some people can oppose deficits for foolish reasons does not
mean that others lack better reasons. The remainder of this section
addresses the mainstream view of deficits and then describes some
arguments offered by economists who emphasize the value of public
investment and thus suggest that the presence of deficits does not
always justify the adoption of contractionary fiscal policies.50
A. The Standard Deficit Story: "Real" and Financial5'
What has become the standard analysis of budget deficits is quite
powerful and deserves to be explained fully and sympathetically. The
story can be told either from a "real" or "financial" perspective. In
the real perspective, the focus is not on the dollars that are borrowed
or saved but on the production of goods and services and the use of
underlying economic resources that are affected by fiscal policy
decisions. "Real" is thus a term of art used to identify analyses that
48 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, tbl. 13 (2006),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.pdf (showing budget deficits as high
as 4.5% of potential GDP and budget surpluses of as much as 2.5% of potential GDP
since 1991).
49 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (2006), available at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (showing average annual inflation
from 1992 through 2006 ranging from 1.6% to 3.4%).
50 Expansionary policies include tax cuts and increases in government spending,
both of which result in greater demand for goods and, if the economy is not at
capacity, an expansion of the economy. Contractionary policies include tax increases
and cuts in government spending.
51 Because the standard story of deficits is so widely espoused, examples of it are
commonplace. See Blinder, supra note 38, at 219-21 (describing the standard story);
see also ROBERT EISNER, THE GREAT DEFICIT SCARES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET,
TRADE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 3-28, 57-58 (1997) [hereinafter EISNER, DEFICIT
SCARES]; BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING (1988) (providing a good
book-length analysis of the standard story); Neil H. Buchanan, Taxes, Saving, and
Macroeconomics, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 59 (1999) (describing the standard story). The
standard story also includes a distinction between long-run and short-run analysis
which is not relevant to the discussion here.
20061
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abstract from financial market effects and focus only on quantities of
resources and how they are used. The government's decision to run a
deficit changes the use of resources in the economy, in turn changing
the composition and (possibly) the quantity of goods and services
produced. These changes can have long-term effects by changing the
way the current economic output is used to create future increases in
productivity and output. In the financial perspective, on the other
hand, the focus is on the amount and use of saved funds in the
economy, with an emphasis on how those funds are deployed to
finance investment in future productivity and output. Both
perspectives suggest that deficits can be very harmful to the economy,
especially in the long run.
The ultimate purpose of the analysis from both perspectives,
therefore, is to ask how our current deficits might affect future
prosperity. Looking at each perspective separately, however, turns
out to lead to unique insights that are not obvious from one
perspective alone.
1. The "Real" Perspective on Budget Deficits
In any given time period, there is a limited amount of productive
inputs available in an economy. The number of workers is not
literally fixed, because it is always possible to allow greater
immigration and to bring citizens into the work force who are not
currently working (as well as increasing the hours worked by
currently-employed citizens). Similarly, the amount of productive
land, technology, factories, and machines is never fixed. Still, the
analysis usually proceeds from the simplifying assumption that there is
some maximum amount of resources available to be employed in the
production of goods and services.
When a government decides to purchase goods and services or to
produce them itself, it might be doing so because the resources of the
economy are not being fully utilized, which means that the
government can put people to work without affecting the rest of the
economy. This was clearly the idea behind the New Deal policies
during the Great Depression, where there was no serious concern that
the government's hiring of workers would do anything but help those
workers and, ultimately, the economy as a whole.
If the economy is not in a depression or a recession, however, any
resources that the government commands for its uses would, by
assumption, be hired by some private entity. This necessarily implies
that a government's purchase of goods and services (or its direct
[Vol. 26:325
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employment of workers) will result in fewer goods and services being
available for purchase by non-governmental actors, or at least that the
composition of the economy's output would be altered by the
government's choices. For example, workers who might have been
employed to provide catering services to private citizens could instead
be employed by the government to work in its cafeterias. Or private
companies that might have produced steel rails might instead produce
military equipment that sits unused.
It is the latter possibility - the diversion of resources from
productive investments - that most concerns those who argue against
budget deficits (and against government spending in general).
Government actions that reduce spending by private citizens on
consumption items like food preparation involves choices about the
current composition and distribution of goods and services - choices
that involve important questions of policy and politics to be sure, but
not the kind of thing that obviously has any longer-term effects.
Making a mistake today is bad for today, but its effect is forgotten
tomorrow. By contrast, if the government decides to divert resources
that would have been used to create capital goods (that is, goods and
services that can be used to increase future output), then mistakes
today last into the future.
The term "crowding out" is commonly used to describe the
problem of government use of resources in a way that reduces the
nation's annual investment in capital goods (commonly called simply
"investment"). This decrease in investment in turn implies a lower
standard of living for future generations as a result of our decision
today to use resources for something that will not contribute to
further increases in economic growth.
Hence, the real perspective highlights the impact of government
decisions that redirect resources out of uses that would lead to more
economic growth and into uses that simply result in more current
consumption. Efforts to reduce the deficit are in essence attempts to
prevent the government from decreasing future living standards by
making such myopic decisions.
2. The Financial Perspective on Budget Deficits
The real perspective, however, begs the question of why it is
budget deficits that harm the future prospects of the economy and not
simply government spending itself that does the harm, no matter
whether that spending is financed by raising taxes or by borrowing
money and issuing debt. If the problem is the government's use of
2006]
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resources, why is that not simply another argument for smaller
government? The financial perspective brings out the difference that
this choice of financing creates.
In the financial perspective, the focus of analysis is on the pool of
saved funds available to be borrowed by private firms, private citizens,
foreign governments, and the domestic government. Saved funds
represent the voluntary decisions by private actors to command fewer
resources (that is, to buy fewer goods and services) than their incomes
would allow them to command in a given year. If a person earned
$100,000 in a year and spent $90,000, the remaining $10,000 would be
a problem if it were not spent, because that would mean that private
companies would receive in the aggregate fewer dollars than they
have paid out in salaries and other forms of income.
Fortunately, the financial markets exist to cycle the saved funds
back into the spending stream. The aggregate amount of saving
(except for the trivial amounts that end up under the proverbial
mattress) is lent out to willing borrowers at market rates of interest.
The pool of savings that is available annually is thus divided up among
willing borrowers, with the interest rate acting as the price of
borrowing.
Just as the real perspective assumed that when the economy is not
in a recession the government's decision to command resources
necessitated their redirection from some other use, the financial
perspective assumes that when the economy is not in a recession the
total amount of savings cannot be increased. Therefore, the pool of
savings is roughly fixed, and the government's decision to command
savings necessitates their redirection away from some private would-
be borrower who now finds it impossible or too expensive to borrow
the funds.
This is the connection to deficits that is not obvious from the real
perspective. When the government runs a balanced budget, it does
not need to borrow money, so it is not involved in the market to lend
out private savings. When it runs a budget deficit, though, it must
finance its spending by borrowing private savings. Fewer savings
remain to be borrowed by private actors, and the interest rate must
rise by an amount sufficient to discourage some potential private
borrowers to cancel or delay their plans to use the money that they
now can no longer afford to borrow.
In the financial perspective, therefore, the budget deficit
determines the total amount of funds that the government must
borrow, and crowding out means that the government has prevented
private companies from borrowing money that they otherwise could
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have spent to invest in capital goods.
This picture is complicated a bit by the existence of foreign trade.
If there is a roughly fixed pool of private savings from which to
borrow, and if the government is going to borrow a certain amount of
funds, domestic private borrowers might avoid the necessity of
reducing their spending by borrowing from abroad. Alternatively, the
government itself might simply borrow from foreign lenders rather
than domestic lenders, leaving the pool of domestic money available
for domestic borrowers. Either way, total domestic spending by
private actors and government combined is larger than it could
otherwise have been.
The possibility of borrowing from abroad, however, does not
mean that there is no crowding out in an important sense. True, the
government's borrowing has not forced domestic borrowers to reduce
their borrowing and spending. However, the obligation to repay the
foreign lenders means that some of the future income of the economy
is now pledged to be paid to foreign actors. The two outcomes -
reduced domestic investment or increased obligations to foreign
lenders - are equivalent in terms of future living standards, for a
somewhat subtle reason.
When private investment falls, that means essentially that
domestic companies are building fewer factories than they otherwise
would build (and they are buying fewer machines to place in their
factories). The output of the economy is thus lower than it would
otherwise be. By borrowing from abroad, it is true that those factories
can be built, but to what end? The output from the factories will, in
the aggregate (and under some technical assumptions that are not
germane here), be equal to the amount of money that domestic
borrowers must pay to foreign lenders.
In other words, a government deficit results in either a reduction
of the future productive capacity of the economy or, in a larger future
economy, a reduction in the amount of the economy's output that
domestic citizens can keep and enjoy. In the standard view, then, so
long as the government's deficit does not generate a compensating
increase in domestic private saving, future living standards are
compromised by government borrowing. Obviously, then, in the
standard story on budget deficits, it is important to reduce deficits and




B. Rejecting versus Amending the Standard Story
The standard story of how fiscal deficits affect the economy is
appealing in many ways. It comports with the "no free lunch" logic at
the core of economic thinking, and it forces policy analysts to think
seriously about the possible costs of running a larger deficit. Surely,
many unfortunate decisions could be avoided by taking seriously the
possibility of crowding out. The standard story provides a powerful
argument - perhaps a sufficient one, but surely not a necessary one
- against the current President Bush's tax policies. Given the highly
regressive composition of the various Bush tax cuts, the standard story
highlights the nature of the tradeoff implied by the Bush-era fiscal
policies: tax cuts today, overwhelmingly benefiting a small, highly
affluent minority of currently-living Americans, will ultimately result
in lower standards of living for everyone in the future." If one wanted
to advocate the repeal of those tax cuts, this is powerful ammunition.
The apparent applicability of the standard story in this context
does not mean, however, that it is complete. One of the profound
dangers of the widespread acceptance of the standard story (or, worse,
of the continuing belief by some people in the "popular folklore"
arguments noted earlier) is that deficit reduction can be seen as per se
good policy. The discussion below includes some specific examples of
the damage that flows from such a presumption. Some
macroeconomists, therefore, emphasize that the standard story is
theoretically incomplete if it does not explicitly include a discussion of
public investment.
Before looking closely at a few of those non-mainstream views,
though, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a virtual
subculture of what might be called "deficit doubters" who combine
conspiracy theories with misleading arguments (and often simply false
53factual assertions). Like "gold bugs," who argue that every
5 TAX POLICY CrR., TAX POLICY: FACTS AND FIGURES (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/template.cfm?PublD=901006
("Assuming [the Bush tax cuts] are either financed with spending cuts or a
combination of reduced spending and progressive tax increases, more than 70 [%] of
households will be net losers; only those in the top income quintile will, on average,
benefit."); cf. Blinder, supra note 38, at 221 (noting that the deficits of the 1980s
financed a "consumption binge," or "a party, to which ... the wealthy were especially
invited").
53 To avoid conferring any credibility on these fringe groups by citing them -
even critically - in an academic article, I will not name any here. The interested




economic problem would be solved by a return to the gold standard,54
or tax protesters, who claim among other things that the entire U.S.
tax system is a hoax and that only income earned abroad may be
taxed,55 or any of a number of other single-minded conspiracy
theorists, there are those who reject the standard view of deficits for
reasons that defy description. This article is clearly not devoted to
cataloging the claims of such fringe elements. Their very presence,
though, unfortunately undermines those who can take issue from solid
logic and evidence with some of the particulars of the standard story
of the budget deficit.
A clear step up from such groups are those who argue that the
budget deficit is not a problem but who make such arguments by
reference to theories that - while clearly not in the mainstream -
have some measure of credibility. So-called supply-side economists
arguably fit into this category. There are certainly respected
politicians who have advocated the theory that tax cuts matter more
than budget deficits (if, indeed, budget deficits matter at all), 56 and
that view continues to be heard in 21st century policy debates, such as
Vice President Dick Cheney's reported argument that "Reagan
proved that deficits don't matter."57
The economics profession has, however, generally been unkind to
such views. Before he became chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors under President Bush from 2002-04 (and thus found himself
in the possibly uncomfortable position of working in an administration
with notable sympathy for supply-side arguments), Harvard's Greg
Mankiw "ridiculed the supply-side tax policies of President Ronald
Reagan as the work of 'charlatans and cranks.
' ''5 8
- Id.
" Cf INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX
ARGUMENTS (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv-tax.pdf
(explaining that federal courts have repeatedly held that all tax protesters' arguments
are baseless).
5 See Edmund L. Andrews, A Pragmatist at Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2002, at Al (discussing supply-side Republicans, noting that "Jack Kemp [is] a former
cabinet secretary and an ardent advocate of tax cuts," and quoting Stephen Moore,
another supply-sider, who criticized a likely nominee for White House economic
advisor as being "hypersensitive about budget deficits"). See generally JACK KEMP,
AN AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s (1979).
57 Jonathan Weisman, Reagan Policies Gave Green Light to Red Ink, WASH.
POST, June 9, 2004, at All (discussing RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY (2004)).
58 Edmund L. Andrews, Economics Adviser Learns the Principles of Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at C4 (referring to a comment in N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS (ist ed. 1998)).
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Even to those who largely disagree with supply-siders, such a
characterization comes across as rather unfairly putting supply-siders
in the same category as the conspiracy theorists noted above. The
reason that supply-side economics must be rejected, after all, is not
that its basic theoretical assumption is perverse or illogical. Indeed, it
could have turned out to be true that cutting tax rates encouraged
people to increase their economic activity so much that tax revenue
overall would have risen when rates were decreased. 9 It is the
continued belief that such an outcome is certain - even in the face of
continuing evidence to the contrary - that earns the derision of
economists like Mankiw. Because of this, supply-side believers are a
breed apart from the academic mainstream.
By contrast, the economists who point out that the standard
deficit story overlooks the importance of public investment are highly
respected within the economics community; and while some of their
fellow economists would surely disagree on the specifics of various
proposals for public investment, there is no serious argument that
public spending can never be productive. The discussion below thus
describes not a different theory of deficits but simply the too-often-
forgotten side of the theory behind the standard story of deficits.
C. Public and Private Investment
While the standard story of how deficits harm the future prospects
of the economy through crowding out commands a great deal of
understandable respect, the story as told above (and as usually
described in textbooks) elides a very important assumption.
Specifically, while the story above suggests that the amount of
crowding out due to a deficit is exactly equal to the government deficit
itself (that is, a $300 billion deficit causes a $300 billion reduction in
investment), the likelihood is that the dollar amount of the budget
deficit actually represents the upper limit on the actual amount of
private investment that will be crowded out (and the lower limit is
zero).
59 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Rival Tax Relief Plans Reflect Stark Differences
Between Spitzer and Faso, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at B1 (describing as "classic
supply-side economics" the belief that "tax cuts will reinvigorate the state's economy
and bring people, jobs and revenue back to the state"). Note, however, that tax




1. Is Private Investment Being Crowded Out?
The crowding out story says, in essence, that people and firms will
reduce their investment in capital goods when they are unable to
borrow as much as they would have liked in the financial markets. It
is true that they will borrow less than they might otherwise have
wished to borrow, but not everyone was necessarily going to borrow
exclusively for the purpose of financing the purchase of capital goods.
If the government's borrowing causes someone not to borrow to
finance a consumption item, then the future is not harmed. Again, the
government is causing a redistribution of goods and services, but the
effect is immediate and has no long-term consequences.
Similarly, some of the items that are called "investment" in the
usual statistical compilations might not be particularly productive
capital goods in real life. The theory, of course, implies that private
firms will choose to finance only those investments that are expected
to have a rate of return that exceeds the borrowing rate of interest.
Thus, the market on its own should police the use of funds for
unproductive purposes. Theory, as always, has only an imperfect
connection to reality; and there are far too many examples of gross
over-investment in capital goods that turn out to be useless (empty
office buildings and strip malls, to name two prominent examples)
simply to assume that every dollar of investment that might be
crowded out would have been spent on capital goods that would pay a
high rate of return.6°
Finally, this last point raises the possibility that an economy can
61be at a saturation point when it comes to private investment. At an
extreme, there is a point where increases in the stock of capital goods
have such a low payoff that they are not worth it even from the
standpoint of paying to maintain those same capital goods. In such a
case, the government's policymakers should not be locked into a view
that presumes that more private investment is and must always be the
goal of fiscal policy. More generally, fiscal policy should at least take
60 See, e.g., EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra note 51, at 66 n.25 (1997)
("Resources may well have been wasted on half-empty shopping centers and office
buildings, on misguided investment in steel capacity, and on nuclear power plants that
proved uneconomical.").
61 David M. Cutler et al., An Aging Society: Opportunity or Challenge?
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 68 (1990) (noting commentary by Robert
Gordon that, at that time, there was adequate saving - even after taking account of




account of the possibility of private investment being misdirected into
unproductive ventures.
2. Is Government Spending Really Worse than Private Spending?
In addition to the question of whether the private spending that is
crowded out by a budget deficit would have raised future living
standards, there is an even more central question of whether the
government has purchased productive capital of its own. This
possibility, which is at the core of the view of deficits that focuses on
public investment, highlights the other hidden assumption behind the
view that a $300 billion deficit crowds out $300 billion of investment.
As the discussion above noted, it is it unclear that a deficit
automatically results in the government borrowing money from
private entities who would have spent it on capital goods - or if they
would have spent the money on capital goods, that those capital goods
would necessarily have been productive. Even if the spending that
was crowded out would have resulted in productive private
investment, though, it could still be better for the government to run a
deficit if the government's spending would result in investment that
was even more productive than the private investment that it crowded
out.
To illustrate, if the government's borrowing prevented private
businesses from engaging in buying items that would have had a
healthy rate of return of, say, 5% per year, the government could
invest in something that has a higher payoff. Public investments in
early-childhood health and nutrition, next-generation technologies
(medical and industrial), alternative energy systems, and improved
public education (both pre-college and university level), among
others, are all likely to have very handsome long-term payoffs,62 with
63the possibility of double-digit annual rates of return. If so, then
there is not only no harm from running a deficit to spend money on
61 William T. Dickens et al., The Effects of Investing in Early Education on
Economic Growth, in BROOKINGS POL'Y BRIEF 153 (Apr. 2006) (describing a
universal preschool program and a model of its effects on GDP if adopted
nationwide, estimating an increase in GDP in 2080 of over $2 trillion (in 2005 dollars)
- an increase of about 3.5 % - and that in 2080, predicting that the program will
generate a net fiscal surplus of $341 billion for the federal government).
63 ART ROLNICK & ROB GRUNEWALD, FED. RESERVE BD. OF MINNEAPOLIS,
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH A HIGH PUBLIC
RETURN 9, tbl. 1B (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.mpls.frb.org/pubs/fedgaz/03-
03/earlychild.cfm?js=0 (showing a total estimated real internal rate of return of 16%
for the a universal preschool program).
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such things, but actually a net benefit to ourselves and to future
generations. Future economic output due to the government's
investment will actually be higher than it would have been if there had
been no crowding out of private investment.
This possibility has long been well understood by
macroeconomists. Blinder, for example, notes that "government
investments . ..entail expenditures today in order to reap returns
tomorrow," 64 referring to evidence that the United States has
underinvested in public infrastructure capital such as "roads, bridges,
airports, and waste treatment facilities" and that such investments
have high rates of return.6' He also noted that "prenatal care,
postnatal care, and preschool education have very high rates of return
[but] the benefits come much later." 66 Similarly, Robert Gordon has
argued that the "real problem for policy.., is the lack of public
investment. ,67
Of course, the government might not invest in high-return
projects and it might not even invest at all. Certainly, there are plenty
of examples of government waste, including the now-infamous
"Bridge to Nowhere" in Alaska, which was financed by Congress -
notwithstanding extensive public ridicule - at a cost of $223 million
68in 2005, even though it would benefit fewer than fifty people. This
hardly provides reassurance to those who suspect that the process by
which government spending decisions are made is fundamentally
broken.
Moreover, even government spending projects that are not
wasteful (in the strict sense of providing little or no benefit to anyone)
might simply not be an investment in the future, such as paying
slightly more to subsidize higher-quality meals at an employee
cafeteria for a government agency. Such spending can be defended as
something better than sending Congressmen to play golf abroad, but it
should almost certainly be paid for with current tax revenues rather
than with borrowed funds that might otherwise be spent on
productive private investments.
Even if one is skeptical of the government's ability to restrict itself
to high-productivity investments, though, the situation may not be
Blinder, supra note 38, at 221.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 222.
67 Cutler et al., supra note 61.
68 Rebecca Claren, A Bridge to Nowhere, SALON, Aug. 9, 2005, http://archive.
salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/09/bridges (citing $941 million cost of controversial
projects for Alaska, of which $223 million was earmarked for that particular bridge).
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symmetric. That is, even if most spending increases do end up buying
wasteful or low-productivity items, that does not mean that spending
decreases as part of deficit reduction plans will only (or even mostly)
cut the worst items first. The same pork-barrel mentality that creates
the waste in the first place can also protect it - and once it is in place,
it is arguably more difficult to end a program upon which some people
can now claim to be relying. Cuts in spending might therefore come
not from eliminating the waste but from reducing spending that helps
the politically weak.
As the discussion below demonstrates, at least the latter concern
is very real. A general atmosphere in which political points are
earned by cutting the deficit can lead to harmful cuts in public
investment. Because of this possibility, a more nuanced view of
government spending and deficit reduction is necessary.
3. Government Spending on Basic Research
Barry Bluestone, an economist at Northeastern University, has
described how former President Clinton's fiscal policies elevated
deficit reduction over what he viewed as intelligent spending on future
productivity.69  Discussing Clinton's deficit reduction policies,
Bluestone took issue with the idea - based unmistakably on the
standard story of budget deficits, or what Bluestone and his frequent
co-author Bennett Harrison called "the Wall Street-Pennsylvania
Avenue Accord" - that deficit reductions in the 1990s were the cause
of the economic prosperity during that decade (a decade that saw the
longest uninterrupted economic expansion of the post-World War II
era).7 ° Bluestone characterized Clinton and his advisors as having
concluded that "if reducing deficits is good, cutting them to zero must
be better, and running outright surpluses must be best of all."'"
Bluestone pointed out that productivity growth had actually
bottomed out in the 1981-82 recession and that it had risen from the
low reached during the Carter years (0.8 % per year), reaching a
higher average growth rate under each succeeding presidential
administration: 1.6% under Reagan, 1.7% under George H.W. Bush,
72and 2.1% under Clinton. Under President George W. Bush's
69 Barry Bluestone & Jonathan Chait, Clinton's Bequest Reconsidered, 11 AM.
PROSPECr 18, 19 (2000) (disagreeing, in an exchange between the co-authors, on the
causes of economic prosperity during the Clinton years).





administration, even with the return to annual deficits, productivity
growth has averaged 3.2% per year for the first half-decade of this
century.73 With improvement occurring during periods in which the
74deficit both rose and fell, Bluestone argued that is difficult to see a
clear correlation between Clinton's policies and economic growth - a
correlation that is just as difficult to discern, if not more so, from the
statistics for the years since Bluestone wrote.
Notably, Bluestone agrees with the broad conclusions of the
standard story of budget deficits: "Of course, if we had continued to
pile up deficits in excess of 4 % of GDP, the escalating debt would
have eventually stymied growth., 75 Nevertheless, he argues that the
typical crowding out story reverses cause and effect: "High
productivity growth.., begets lower interest rates, 76 not the other
way around. "With or without the fiscal conservatism of the [Clinton]
administration, the economy would be in pretty good shape today."77
What, then, causes high productivity growth? Rather than being
the result of low budget deficits or low interest rates, Bluestone
suggests that the prosperity of the nineties was due to policies that had
been adopted in previous decades, in particular those policies that had
enabled the breakthroughs in information technology that were
beginning to be felt in the economy most strongly in late 1990s.7"
While there is an inevitable delay between the introduction of a
"startling new technology" and its payoff in productivity growth,
"[t]he full-scale productivity premium is only just now being
realized. 79
The explosion in information technology had begun in university
laboratories and private companies, but "much of the initiative and
funding for this research came from the government.
80
Unfortunately, as part of the focus on fiscal conservatism, the federal
73 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PRODUCTIVITY & COSTS, available at
http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/prodnr.htm#2006 (showing annual productivity
growth in the business sector from 2001 through 2005 of 2.2%, 4.3%, 4.1%, 3.1%, and
2.3%).
74 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA tbl. 13 (2006),
available at http://www.cbo.govfbudget/historical.pdf (showing highly variable deficits
in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s).
75 Bluestone & Chait, supra note 69, at 18.
76 Id. at 18-19.
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government under Clinton slashed funding for basic research, public
infrastructure, education, and training.8' The federal share of
spending on research and development continued its drop from
roughly 50% in 1979 to 26.7% in 1999.82 This share bottomed out in
83the year 2000 when Bluestone's article was published, but by 2004
the share was still slightly below 30%.84
More broadly, Bluestone argued that "the single most important
factor behind long cycles of prosperity is the level of technological
advance,85 and that research that leads to long-term technological
advances is so speculative and so hard to finance that "only the
federal government has the means and the patience to do this." 86 He
concluded that "Clinton's larger legacy has been to paralyze public
investment." 87
In short, Bluestone's concern was a version of the "baby with the
bathwater" phenomenon. He would gladly have the federal
government eliminate waste and maybe raise taxes to move closer to
budget balance, but he deplored the loss of public support for the
government's funding of basic research that accompanied Clinton's
obsession with deficit reduction.
4. Correct Measurements and Public Investment
Starting in 1984, the late Robert Eisner (and a frequent co-author,
Paul Pieper) wrote a series of articles that attempted to describe the
shortcomings of the government's methods of deficit accounting and
that argued for a general reduction in public hysteria about budget
deficits. 88 Although much of the work was technical, Eisner's major
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 NAT'L SCI. FOUND., NATIONAL PATrERNS OF R&D RESOURCES tbl. 2,
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06327/pdf/tab2.pdf (showing the federal
share of research and development spending at 24.8% in 2000).
Id. (revised figures showing that in 2004, the latest year available, the federal
share of research and development spending was 29.9%).
85 Bluestone & Chait, supra note 69, at 19.
86 Id. at 19-20.
87 Id. at 20.
88 Robert Eisner & Paul J. Pieper, A New View of the Federal Debt and Budget
Deficits, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1984, at 11; see also EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra
note 51, at 3-28, 57-58. For a list of Eisner's other papers on this subject, see Neil H.
Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays 101-02, 153-54, 220 (Aug.
5, 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Buchanan, Dissertation].
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point was that there was no reason to believe that the best fiscal policy
was to balance the annual budget.
In particular, Eisner pointed out that "balance" has many
different meanings, and in the context of debt, the most appropriate
way to assess balance or imbalance would be to look at the debt as a
percentage of national income. 9 Balance would then best describe a
situation where a government's debt as a percentage of its national
income remains unchanged from year to year, such that a growing
economy can be in balance if the government's debt grows at the same
rate as national income grows. The annual deficit, in such a
situation, would be positive, but the budget would be "balanced" in
the sense that the debt-to-income ratio would be stable from year to
year.
As Eisner noted, there is nothing about any particular debt-to-
income ratio that recommends it over any other.9' His point was that
there is no persuasive reason to worry about balancing the annual
budget with a zero deficit, since that actually implies a shrinking debt-
to-income ratio over time. There is, moreover, nothing special about
zero total government debt as a goal. It, too, is arbitrary.
Eisner was also prominent in advocating the use of a deficit
measure that adjusts each year's deficit to account for the health of
the economy. Because an economy in recession is likely to cause an
increase in the budget deficit,92 fixation on the deficit can lead to
perverse spirals in which a recession causes an increase in the deficit,
the government cuts spending and raises taxes to attack the deficit,
and those contractionary policies in turn worsen the recession and
lead to further deficits.93
For the purposes of long-term analysis, of course, transitory shifts
in budget deficits due to economic cycles are beside the point. Over
time, it is the trends in the economy that matter. On this point, Eisner
agreed with the economists cited above about the importance of
public investment. "Capital of all kinds - public and private, physical
89 His justification for the proposal is that the size of the economy determines
the ability of the economy to carry its debt burden, much as a bank will lend larger
sums of money to higher-income borrowers. EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra note 51,
at 9.
90 Id. at 9-10.
91 Id. at 12.
92 An increase in the budget deficit would be caused by the reduction in tax
revenues when workers lose their jobs and the increases in government transfer




and intangible, human and nonhuman - contributes to future
production. If deficits add to our stock of productive capital, they
actually help secure the future - for our children and
grandchildren. 94
Eisner agreed that "[p]ublic investment can also be misguided,
although there is increasing evidence that, in general, the largely
public investment in infrastructure and particularly in human capital
has had a high payoff."95 Like Bluestone, he argued that "[d]eficit
paranoia and budget balancing mania can be dangerous, extremely
dangerous, to our economic health.,
96
Eisner's contributions to our understanding of deficits, therefore,
reinforce and extend the arguments discussed above. Correcting the
measurement errors would allow us to see more clearly the effects of
our policies, but the big policy message remains that public investment
must not become a casualty of deficit cutting policies.97
Attempts to focus attention on public investment, therefore, do
not amount to a claim that "deficits do not matter" but rather to a call
for greater clarity in what we are really arguing about. Government
borrowing for unproductive projects is harmful to future generations,
but we cannot simply assume that deficit reduction by any means
necessary will lead to an increase in net investment and thus in future
prosperity.
D. What Do We Owe Future Generations?
Finally, the discussion above has accepted for the sake of
argument that it is always bad to enact policies that reduce the living
standards of future generations. The rhetoric of fiscal stewardship
easily lends itself to this assumption, as it would feel odd indeed to
argue that there is nothing irresponsible about reducing the wealth of
our children and grandchildren.
Nevertheless, if we are thinking about a choice between doing
something that benefits people living today (even something
undeniably frivolous) or denying ourselves that choice in order to
benefit our progeny, we need to think very seriously about how to
94 Id. at 27.
95 Id. at 66 n.25.
96 Id. at 28.
97 See also Dickens et al., supra note 62, at 6 ("Because most of these benefits [of
public investment] are longer-term while the costs of mounting the programs are




balance the interests of present and future generations. In a future
article, I will describe in much more detail the philosophical literature
regarding intergenerational justice and will offer a proposed approach
to balancing present and future interests.
For present purposes, however, it is perhaps sufficient simply to
emphasize that discussion of this question is almost entirely absent
from the policy literature on budget deficits. Eisner and others
regularly argue that their policies are the best for truly guaranteeing
the prosperity of future generations, yet there is little if any
discussion of why we must do so. Eisner at least raised the issue and
questioned seriously whether it is right to engage in policies
(especially reductions in benefits for elderly Americans) that will
benefit future generations, particularly when those future generations
are likely to be much wealthier than we are.99 The rhetoric of "future
generations," though, permeates discussions of long-term deficits. 1°°
Similarly, I raised the intergenerational equity issue briefly in a
working paper in early 2004,101 to which Daniel Shaviro responded
briefly later that year.102 I included a very brief discussion of the issue
in a subsequent article, including a response to Shavro.'03 Despite
these very scant acknowledgements of the issue, the glaring fact is that
this question of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy remains highly
under-theorized. The discussion in this article should be viewed in
that light, with my full acknowledgement that I (like almost everyone
else who discusses budget deficits) am accepting the normative
standard that "harming future generations" should be avoided - even
if any harm that we might cause would still leave the living standards
98 "Capital of all kinds - public and private, physical and intangible, human and
nonhuman - contributes to future production. If deficits add to our stock of
productive capital, they actually help secure the future - for our children and
grandchildren." Id. at 27.
99 EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra note 51, at 57-58.
100 See, e.g., Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 2, at 322-25 and sources
discussed therein.
101 Neil H. Buchanan, What Is Fiscal Responsibility? Long-Term Deficits,
Generational Accounting, and Capital Budgeting 38-43 (Rutgers Univ. (Newark)
Legal Working Paper Series, Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.
com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art8 (hereinafter Buchanan, Fiscal Responsibility).
102 Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration's Policy of
Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1285, 1330-33
(2004). Shaviro does not cite my unpublished article, but the issues he raises are
found in that piece.
103 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 2, at 323-24.
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of future generations much higher than today's living standards.'0 4 In
future work, I will explore in detail the philosophical and practical
questions of intergenerational justice, focusing in particular on how to
balance the interests of unborn generations with those of currently
living human beings.' 5
III. A NOBLE DECEPTION?
If the discussion above is persuasive, it would suggest that we
should immediately change our policy rhetoric and openly discuss the
possibility that increases in deficits (or the refusal to take certain
measures to decrease deficits, such as cutting valuable research funds)
are wise public policy. If, after all, it is possible to borrow money at
rates of 5% or 6% and spend the money on a project with a 16% rate
of return,' °6 it would seem perverse not to borrow the money and to
make the investment.
A very real danger, however, lies in a possible response by the
public and politicians upon learning that deficits really are not always
a bad thing. If believed, this news could plausibly lead to a relaxation
of our collective vigilance against the bad kind of deficits. What if,
say, we engage in new public investments that would together raise
future GDP by 10% in 2017 but, in so doing, we open the door to bad
investments that crowd out enough private investment to decrease
GDP by 20% over that time period? We would clearly have been
better off to pretend that there never were any attractive public
investments for which we might have borrowed.
While such thought experiments are useful, they of course cannot
be tested. Should prudent, well-meaning analysts nevertheless
conclude that the risks are too great - that our public discourse
should proceed without acknowledging the potential benefits of good
deficits as a defense against the unleashing of too much bad deficit
spending? I am not responding here to a specific proposal; I can cite
no serious analyst who has directly articulated in print an argument
that we should consciously deceive people about the availability of
104 Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Long-Term Deficits: When Should We
Worry? 92 CORN. L. REV. 257, 266 (2007) (hereinafter Buchanan, Social Security)
(showing that even pessimistic assumptions result in estimated real standards of living
in 2080 being 131% higher than in 2005).
105 The leading philosophical exploration of questions of intergenerational justice
is DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1986); see also TIM MULGAN, FUTURE
PEOPLE (2006).
106 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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public investment. °7 I raise the point here simply because it is the
only remaining plausible argument against debating publicly the value
of deficits. If opportunities to spend public money productively exist,
and if our current policy debate largely proceeds as if those
opportunities do not exist, then we must either change the debate or
explain why we choose not to do so.
There is plenty of room for reasonable people to disagree on such
an inherently difficult judgment call, of course, but I am ultimately
persuaded that we should simply proceed honestly. First, this is
hardly a matter about which the facts are difficult to find. The
citations in this article are just a handful from the extensive literature
on public investment that exists and that is available to any interested
party.108
It would thus not be plausible for tax policy scholars, economists,
or indeed anyone with an interest in affecting fiscal policy to sustain a
public posture that borrowing to finance public investment is never a
good idea. If directly challenged about that posture, the most that one
could say is that, yes, there are most likely productive public
investments available, but we should not avail ourselves of them. If
that is the nuanced conversation that we must have, though, then it
would be far better simply to say that we are going to look for good
public investments and that we must also be ever vigilant not to
107 Proposals to account specifically for public investment have, however, been
met with skeptical resistance, not because public investment projects are unavailable
but because of a concern that a system that allows government spending to be
classified as "investment" is dangerously open to abuse. See, e.g., Karen Pennar,
Beware of Accounting Magic Tricks, Mr. Clinton, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 18, 1993, at 55.
Along similar lines, economist Paul Krugman recently suggested that, even though he
is in favor of reducing budget deficits, it would be better for Democrats to spend any
savings or tax increases that they can find rather than reducing the deficit. The better
path, he suggests, is to act as if we do not care about reducing the deficit because
other politicians might one day squander whatever savings the current Congress
might find. *Paul Krugman, Democrats and the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at
A35 ("Deficit reduction . . . might just end up playing into the hands of our next
irresponsible president.").
108 In earlier unpublished work, I described in theoretical terms the concept of
public investment and some attempts to measure the amount of public investment
that is undertaken by the federal government. See Buchanan, Fiscal Responsibility,
supra note 101, at 38-43; see also Buchanan, Dissertation, supra note 88, at ch. 1;
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, State-Specific Estimates of State and Local Government Capital,
23 REGIONAL SCi. & URBAN ECON. 185 (1993). In future work, I will analyze the
broader literature on public investment as a step toward advocating that the federal
government adopt a system of accounts that would allow public investment to be
financed without increasing the reported deficit.
20061
Virginia Tax Review
borrow money for foolish reasons. If we cannot maintain the pretense
that deficits are unmistakably bad, then we gain nothing by pretending
otherwise.
Consider the attempt by former presidential candidate Al Gore in
2000 to describe the surpluses in the Social Security trust funds as a
"lock box" in which our future retirement security was safeguarded. 1°9
The problem was that this was "an accounting gimmick, and it later
became possible for President George W. Bush to attempt to secure
public support for his misbegotten plan to create private accounts in
Social Security by claiming that "[t]here is no trust 'fund' - just
IOUs."'' 1 While all analogies are imperfect, and while Bush's attempt
to use the Democrats' misrepresentation of the trust funds to rally
support for his privatization plan failed, this at least suggests that the
consequences of well-meaning deceptions are at best unpredictable
and at worst corrosive to public policy discussion.
Finally, the distributive consequences of forsaking public
investments ultimately make the noble deception appear far less
noble. As suggested above,"' some of the best existing and
prospective public investments most directly benefit the young, the
weak, and the poor before ultimately benefiting the entire economy.
Choosing not to make those investments means quite deliberately
choosing not to help those vulnerable populations in the name of
avoiding some possibly bad choices that we should try to avoid in any
case. While it is imaginable that the net crowding out of private
investment that could result from poor policy choices could end up
being as or more harmful to the politically weak as it would be to fail
to invest directly in their futures, there are no apparent reasons to
think that those possible consequences are as large or as direct as are
the losses from failing to undertake the direct public investments that
would clearly benefit them.
In short, we should not deny or ignore the evidence that there are
109 Robert Kuttner, Getting Over the Lock Box, in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(online edition), Sept. 2, 2001 ("Politically, Gore's strategists thought that by putting
the Social Security reserves off budget, and forcing George W. Bush to take the
"lock-box" pledge, they would make it impossible for Bush to eat into the surplus
with a large tax cut.").
110 Id.
II Associated Press, Bush: Social Security Trust Fund "Just IOUs" (Apr. 5,
2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7393649.
112 For a discussion of the Social Security trust funds and the long-term health of
the Social Security system, see Buchanan, Social Security, supra note 104.
113 Supra Part II.C.2.
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and will continue to be opportunities to make wise public investments
using borrowed funds. We gain nothing in the public debate by
pretending otherwise, and we risk harming those whom we should
least wish to harm.
IV. CONCLUSION
The political fascination with budget deficits in the United States
has led to a great deal of posturing and confusion about the nature of
our fiscal obligations and the best approach for advancing the
interests of future generations. We have reached a point where, with
occasional strategic exceptions, the bipartisan default position is that
all deficits are bad, all the time. Any good economist knows that that
is false.
The standard story about how deficits affect the economy through
"crowding out," of course, does suggest that budget deficits can harm
the economy, under certain conditions - but it also contains (or is at
least not inconsistent with) an alternative story in which deficits are
beneficial to the long-term health of the economy. The most
important way in which reality deviates from the standard story is in
the composition of private and public spending. Crowding out is
harmful when a government spends its money on items that would fail
to raise future productivity while preventing private parties from
buying such productive items. This does not mean, though, that
budget deficits are always bad. It simply means that we should be
sure that the deficit is used to finance public investments that will
increase future productivity. Conversely, we should be especially
vigilant to prevent budget cuts (motivated by a "deficits are always
bad" mentality) from resulting in the elimination of government
spending on important investments, such as supporting education and
basic research and providing assistance to vulnerable populations like
very young children at risk of malnutrition or disease.
Recognizing and discussing these opportunities for public
investment does, however, raise the risk that the policy discussion will
become dangerously muddled. Having opened the door to claims that
some deficits are good, there is at least a possibility that this could
become an opening to justify further increases in the deficit that are
harmful. Ambiguity can be the enemy of sustained political will.
Despite this risk, the arguments in favor of deficit-financed public
investment are too well known, and the consequences of deception
too great (especially for the politically vulnerable members of our
society), to justify a strategy of pretending that the benefits of budget
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deficits do not exist.
Budget deficits matter, but they matter in ways that differ
importantly from the conventional wisdom. We must make sure that
any attempts to measure or reduce budget deficits do not mislead us
into taking actions that might actually make things worse both for us
and for our progeny.
